Strategy has become an increasingly important theme within the management of innovation. This is reflected in the increasing amount of attention given to topics such as technology strategy within the innovation literature. However research into technology strategy has tended to focus on technology acquisition rather than technology exploitation. This paper focuses on one often neglected way in which companies can exploit the technological resources at their disposal, namely through the use of a derivative strategy where new technology is combined with old products or parts of old products in order to develop new products. The paper explores this type of strategy by means of a case study from the commercial jet engine sector of the aerospace industry. The case study provides an opportunity not only to explore the nature of derivative strategies in detail it also highlights the benefits, both direct and indirect, to be gained from this type of strategy as a means of exploiting an organisation's technological resources.
Introduction
The rise, within the field of strategic management, of interest in the resource-based approach to strategy 1 , has led to renewed interest in technology as one of the key resources of the firm. This in turn has produced a growing literature on technology strategy 2, 3 as firms consider the most appropriate way to utilize their technological resources in the longer term.
The concept of technology strategy is defined by Clarke et al. 4 as,
'a strategic approach to the development of a firm's technology.'
By this they mean that issues to do with a firm's technology should not be left to ad hoc short term decisions, but instead should be a central concern of senior management planning on a long term basis.
According to Clarke et al. 5 the central issue in technology strategy is the acquisition, development and exploitation of technology. Acquisition concerns decisions surrounding both the technologies to invest in and how to invest. Clarke et al. 6 note that where the latter aspect is concerned, firms can vary the degree to which technology acquisition is integrated into the organisation's activities. The degree of integration ranging from developing technology in-house to collaboration, licensing and the acquisition of assets. The need to span an ever-greater range of technologies has made technology acquisition a strategic issue in many technology-based companies according to a study by Granstrand et al. 7 . In their study of technology strategy in UK firms Clarke et al. 8 found evidence of increasing use of external methods of technology acquisition, especially among larger firms. This is true of the pharmaceutical industry where firms are increasingly turning to external sources as conduit for acquiring appropriate technologies, and doing so via a variety of collaborative arrangements 9 .
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Just as the acquisition of technology is one of the central concerns of technology strategy, so too is the exploitation of technology, but it appears to have received less attention from researchers. Having acquired and developed technological resources, technology strategy recognises that firms face a variety of options when it comes to the most appropriate exploitation of them.
Among the strategic issues surrounding the exploitation of technological resources are the means to be employed and the question of timing. This latter aspect has spawned a modest but influential literature. When it comes to timing, Christensen 10 has highlighted the dilemma faced by innovators. There are those, such as Foster 11 who advocate the benefits of early moves to secure a 'first mover' advantage, while others, such as Teece 12 have noted that in some circumstances a 'follower/imitator' strategy may be more appropriate.
When it comes to the means for exploiting technologies a variety of degrees of integration are available. Much attention in recent years has focussed on external arrangements for exploiting technology. This is especially true of the aerospace industry. External methods such as licencing have long been popular in aerospace, reflecting the huge sunk costs of aerospace programmes and the often complex political issues surrounding market access. More recently the aerospace industry has attracted a variety of collaborative arrangements 13 . Generically termed strategic alliances, they include various forms of joint venture and risk sharing partnership.
While the external means for exploiting technological resources have attracted considerable attention, the internal means have remained somewhat neglected by researchers reflecting the relative lack of developments in this field. The means for exploiting technological resources through internal means is normally confined to innovation in the form of new product development. However as Keeble 14 has pointed out, innovation is not confined to new product development, it can also involve continuing product innovations. Rothwell 18 , is a good example 19 . In aerospace this is usually termed a derivative strategy rather than re-innovation and the aim of this paper is to explore the concept of derivative strategy as a means of exploiting the technological resources of the firm as part of a technology strategy. Specifically the paper aims to explore the nature of derivative strategy, identify the potential benefits from this kind of technology strategy and explain why aerospace firms find it an attractive proposition. The paper does this by means of a case study of an aero engine programme. identify as the third phase of the industry's evolution beginning in the early 1980s.
The first of these difficulties was a deteriorating financial position 36 . In 1980 the company started to make substantial losses, caused in large part by a decision not to hedge the foreign exchange risk associated with its foreign currency transactions 37 .
This policy had brought significant profits in the late 1970s, but as Britain became an oil exporting nation in the early 1980s, and the in-coming government instituted a high interest rate policy, the company was caught out by the rapid appreciation of the UK pound. In 1981 Rolls-Royce made a loss of £93m and this worsened to £115m 38 two years later, almost all attributable to the foreign exchange risk associated with its American contracts 39 .
The second of these difficulties focussed on adverse competitive conditions at the beginning of the decade. The combination of de-regulation in the US and a worldwide recession 40 noise, and due to come into effect in 1986 43 , which meant that Rolls-Royce's existing medium-sized engines of 10,000 -20,000lbs thrust, the Spey and the Conway, which had been designed at a time when noise issues were not a priority, would be obsolete. *********** Insert Table 1 *********** Finally Rolls-Royce faced the prospect that since most of the airliners which utilized its medium sized jet engines had, or soon would, cease production. Table 1 shows that by 1980 most of the first generation European airliners introduced in the 1960s, had ceased or were about to cease production. Since almost all of these airliners, including the French built Caravelle, were Rolls-Royce powered, the company was facing a bleak position in terms of sales of all but its large engines.
Just how bleak this picture was is illustrated by figures from Rolls-Royce itself. The company estimated that in 1980 it was producing engines for just four types of commercial airliner 44 . This compares with General Electric which offered engines for nine types and Pratt and Whitney which offered engines for ten 45 . With such a narrow product range inevitably Rolls-Royce's long term prospects in the commercial jet engine market were poor.
New Engines
By the early 1980s Rolls-Royce was not the only company worried about the consequences of new noise regulations. The American business jet manufacturer Gulfstream, was extremely concerned. The company's Gulfstream III business jet powered by two Rolls-Royce Spey engines was proving very successful 46 . Table 2 shows that sales to American customers were building up steadily in the early 1980s Rolls-Royce were planning another more powerful engine that was also capable of meeting their requirements but with two engines rather than four, they cancelled the project with immediate effect. The other engine that Rolls-Royce was planning was the Hi-flow Spey or as it was eventually known, the Tay engine.
The Tay engine
The studies which led to the launch of this other more powerful engine, began with the search by the Dutch aircraft manufacturer, Fokker, for a quieter powerplant as a way of overcoming the problems it faced with its Spey powered short haul F28 Consequently earlier work on the Spey had focussed on simply fitting a larger fan to the front of the engine in order to raise the bypass ratio and make it quieter. In the mid-1970s, work on the Spey 606 62 , a new version of the Spey with a larger fan to
give an increased bypass ratio of 1.96, reached the detailed engineering design stage.
However the airframe application intended for this engine, the BAC One Eleven 700, Fokker ordered 100 engines for its new F100 regional jet and further orders soon followed (see to the project ensuring that the various hurdles the project faced were successfully negotiated. This was important. The Thatcher government had won a second term in 1983 and indicated that it wanted to see Rolls-Royce privatised in the near future. As a result short term financial performance was a high priority for the company. The business case for the Tay showed that although total expenditure on the project was comparatively modest at almost £100million, the greatest outlay was likely to occur in the run up to privatisation. Cashflow was unlikely to be positive until the end of the decade. Under these circumstances the project had some important internal hurdles to clear within the company, that could easily have led to cancellation.
As it turned out development of the Tay Gulfstream IV. Nor was success confined to the 'heavy iron' business jet market. Table 3 shows that the engine enjoyed considerable success in the regional airliner market, with deliveries of the Fokker F100 and its sister airliner the slightly smaller F70, reaching more than 300 by the late 1990s. In addition the Tay successfully opened up a market niche that was not part of the original business plan when the engine was first launched, namely the market for re-engining airliners being converted to freighters. The company's biggest success in this market came in 1990
when Rolls-Royce successfully negotiated the sale of 280 Tay engines as part of a $600 million contract to re-engine the entire Boeing 727-100 fleet of United Parcel Service (UPS) to enable it to meet new more stringent noise regulations 65 .
*********** Insert Table 4 ***********
Derivative Strategy: the application of advanced technology
Unlike the earlier Hi-flow Spey project that was ultimately stillborn, the Tay engine project involved much more than simply fitting a bigger fan. The aim was to take the well proved and reliable high pressure 'hot core' of the Spey engine and combine it with elements of the advanced technology developed as part of the RB211 programme. In this the Tay differed from other similar derivative engines produced by Rolls-Royce at this time such as the 524 and 535 engines. These were derivative engines, but they were developed as up-rated and de-rated versions of the RB211.
That Rolls-Royce was able to develop two new engines in this way was testimony to the RB211 concept which proved to be a truly robust design 66 .
The Tay was different in that the intention was not so much to make it more or less powerful (in fact it was considerably more powerful), but to apply the technology of another more modern engine programme, in order that it could meet the more demanding requirements of the market. However a later version of the engine, the Mk 555 developed for the Fokker F28
airliner, was much more reliable and the 'hot core' of this version of the Spey formed the basis of the Tay. To this 'hot core', or high pressure (HP) section which forms the heart of a modern turbofan engine, was added a new fan and associated booster stages at the front of the engine, a new low pressure (LP) turbine at the rear of the engine, needed to power the new fan, a new combustion system and a new larger bypass duct.
In each case the opportunity was taken to employ the latest RB211 derived advanced technology in each of these modules.
The most obvious case of this was the new fan. Early single stage fans, such as that employed on the Spey used high aspect ratio blades made from forged titanium. The blades themselves were long and thin. The width of the fan blade was restricted by the need for low weight in order to avoid containment problems in the event of damage to the fan. While a narrow blade was lighter it was subject to vibration. To eliminate this it was necessary to brace the blades at approximately mid-length by means of a 'snubber', a reinforcing ring designed to support the blades. The snubber contributed nothing to the fan's primary function and had an adverse effect on efficiency because it gave rise to pressure losses that reduced the flow capacity of the fan 67 .
In place of this type of arrangement, the Tay utilized a 'wide chord' fan derived from the 535E4 version of the RB211. Rolls-Royce's attachment to the idea of a wide chord fan went back to the 1960s when the company developed a wide chord fan constructed of carbon fibre composite for the original RB211 68 . Unfortunately while the fan proved more efficient, it presented problems of blade integrity which at the time could not be resolved. However, while the company was forced to revert to a titanium fan using snubbers for the RB211, it stuck with the idea of a wide chord fan and in the early 1980s developed a hollow titanium wide chord fan that was both light and strong. The first engine to benefit from this development in fan technology was the 535E4 engine which first flew in August 1983 and went into revenue earning service on the Boeing 757 in October 1984 69 .
djs/ Tay The fan on the Tay employed a solid titanium fan blade, rather than a hollow one, but it was nonetheless a wide chord design and it provided significant improvements in thrust, fuel economy and noise reduction.
Nor was the wide chord fan design the only example of RB211 advanced technology utilized on the Tay. The opportunity was taken to significantly increase the bypass ratio. By the early 1980s Rolls-Royce, along with other engine manufacturers had a better grasp of the design features of turbofan engine architecture, helped by their experiences in developing the first generation of high bypass engines like the RB211.
As Gunston 75 notes, 'the advent of the giant wide-bodied airliners made it self-evident that their quiet fuel efficient technology would have to percolate down to smaller airliners'.
Thus the fan used on the Tay was bigger than that on the Spey, being some 44 inches in diameter, and this made it possible to configure the engine with the bypass ratio raised from 0.64 on the Spey to 3.0 76 . With a much bigger proportion of the flow of air into the engine now bypassing the core, this made the engine both quieter and more efficient.
The bypass duct through which the air was fed represented another area where new technology was applied. Rolls-Royce was one of the first aerospace companies to see the potential of carbon fibre technology. Although its first application of this technology, the carbon fibre fan, proved unsuccessful, the company continued to be, 'interested in the use of carbon fibre for aero engines' 77 . The Tay was the first commercial aero engine to utilize a carbon fibre bypass duct 78 . Using this material brought benefits in terms of reduced weight and greater strength.
Other major engine sub-systems benefited from the application of advanced technology developed for Rolls-Royce's large high thrust engines. On the Tay a new djs/Tay Engine/01 December 2009 P o s t -P r i n t combustion chamber was developed incorporating porous Transply material that reduced the amount of cooling air required resulting in improved engine efficiency 79 .
Similarly a new three stage low pressure (LP) turbine was used with improved aerodynamics designed for high efficiency and low noise generation 80 .
Discussion
Essentially the development of the Tay As a case the Tay engine sheds light on the potential benefits to be derived from derivative strategies. When compared with the alternative technology strategy of developing an entirely new engine, the derivative approach, as exemplified by the Tay provides a number of benefits. For an engine manufacturer, such as Rolls-Royce, the benefit of utilizing an existing engine 'hot core' is that it significantly reduces the cost of developing a new engine 82 and getting it into production. Since the 'hot core' is the part of the engine that, in terms of temperature and pressure 83 Secondly the development of a new engine 'hot core' is a lengthy process. Again this is because this section of the engine operates under such demanding conditions.
Inevitably it takes a long time to design, develop and certificate. The development of a new 'hot core' can easily mean that it takes six to ten years to get a new engine into production, even longer than for the development of a new airframe 87 . In contrast the development of the Tay, using an existing reliable and well proven 'hot core' took four years. Given the gap that had appeared in Rolls-Royce's product portfolio by the early 1980s when the company could supply engines for just four civil airframe applications 88 , reducing the lead time taken to get the new engine into service was an important consideration.
Finally using an existing core reduces can provide important benefits for an engine manufacturers' customers, especially when the engine is a relatively small one and used on aircraft such as regional jets which are used for short routes and therefore subject to extensive maintenance. Parts on the 'hot core' of the engine, such as high pressure (HP) turbine blades, represent one of the major costs to an operator in terms of the purchases of spares 89 . Hence using an existing 'hot core' means that airlines have much less need to re-train maintenance staff or invest in additional spares inventory.
However as well as these direct benefits from a technology strategy based on applying new technology to an existing and established product to create a new product, there are further indirect benefits that have important implications in terms of corporate strategy and the strategic management of an enterprise.
Firstly, Rolls-Royce's long term strategy has in recent years been to achieve a 30 per cent share of the total commercial jet engine market 90 . In the 1970s and 1980s the company's market share was at best about 10 per cent. The logic behind the pursuit of a substantially bigger market share as a strategic goal is that the commercial jet engine market has traditionally been dominated by three firms, the 'Big Three' of Pratt and , implying that aero engine manufacturers aim to offer a product portfolio that covers all sectors of the commercial jet engine market. Thus the derivative strategy employed to develop the Tay engine, as well as providing direct benefits also contributed indirect benefits. These were particularly important in terms of the company's competitive strategy, the cornerstone of which was the maintenance of a competitive technology base.
Conclusion
The case study of the Tay 
